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ABSTRACT.  The question arising from this article regards the meaning of
sacrifice within the frame of Jan Patočka’s philosophy. Is human sacrifice
aimed at reinforcing an institution or state of things as in the case of the
Unknown Soldier narrative, or is it rather – as Patočka maintained – an
essentially  destabilizing deed,  which has the  power  to shatter  people’s
knowledge  and existence?  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  I  contrast
Patočka’s  standpoint  with  those  of  Émile  Durkheim  and  of  the  main
representatives  of  the  so-called  “sacred  sociology”:  Roger  Caillois,
Georges  Bataille  and  other  members  of  the  Collège  de  sociologie.  In
conclusion, I show how Patočka’s approach to the theme of sacrifice helps
to understand whether and how a “proper sacrifice” can actually become
an instrument of political dissent within human societies.
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Among  the  keywords  that  characterize  Jan  Patočka’s  later  work,
“sacrifice”  is  one  of  the  most  important  and  widely  discussed.
Although  Patočka  never  dedicated  a  detailed  investigation  to  this
concept,  the  many  references  to  sacrifice  in  some  of  his  most
celebrated  works  from  the  1970s1 became  the  object  of  thorough
analyses from various commentators.2 
During a discussion with his students that followed one of his later
seminars,  Patočka  makes  a  distinction  between  what  he  called  a
“proper”, authentic sacrifice, and what on the contrary represents for
him an “improper”, misused notion of sacrifice.3 For Patočka, a proper
sacrifice is a fundamentally destabilizing deed, which has the power to
shatter people’s knowledge and existence. By sacrificing themselves,
humans realize a sort of “counter-performance” insofar as they do not
achieve  any  specific  purpose  or  advantageous  outcome.  Rather,  by
accomplishing  this  deed  they  reach  «the  extreme  limit  that  the
historical situation dictates to them, and that [they] have to accept».4
On the contrary, a sacrifice is improper when it is intended to generate
a profitable exchange – when its instrumental purpose consists not in
shattering, but in re-establishing or reinforcing an institution or state
of  things.  We might  consider  the  famous line from Horace’s  ode –
«Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori» (To die for one’s fatherland is
right and proper)5 – as an example of this improper, institutionalized
concept of sacrifice, for which the death of human beings is perceived
as a  tragic  yet  necessary event,  which can therefore be accepted in
view  of  a  higher,  collective  good.  On  this  view,  the  celebration  of
sacrifice facilitates a pacification and stabilisation of the social milieu.
1 See PATOČKA 2002c, 101ff; 2002d, 147-60; 2002a, 374-423. References to sacrifice can also be
found in Patočka’s earlier works. See PATOČKA 2004a [1946], 130.
2 See  DERRIDA 1999;  UČNÍK 2011, 187-201;  MELANÇON 2013;  DODD 2015, 23-30;  PERRYMAN-
HOLT 2015, 64-92; ALVIS 2017.
3 PATOČKA 2002a, 421.
4 PATOČKA 2002a, 421.
5 See HORACE 2014, 95.
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This  pacification  is  often  grounded  on  the  sacred  body  of  the
Unknown  Soldier,  or  on  the  sacred  body  of  the  nation  itself.6
According  to  this  interpretation,  sacrifice  has  a  normalizing  and
soothing function, which – instead of reaching “the extreme limits” of
the human condition in history – tends to conceal the terrible conflicts
that often characterize this condition by re-establishing peace through
collective mourning. 
The  regular  recurrence  within  history  of  this  instrumental
interpretation  of  sacrifice  is  easily  demonstrated.7 In  the  twentieth
century,  Horace’s  line became a widespread maxim within national
and military rhetoric and even today it remains visible on monuments
and inscriptions – for instance at the front entrance to the Arlington
Memorial Amphitheater in Virginia (US).8 At the same time, however,
people who directly experienced the atrocities of warfare started to
challenge this kind of interpretation. In their writings on war, English
poets  Siegfried  Sassoon  and  Wilfred  Owen  repeatedly  underlined,
with tragic and ironic tones, the limits and hypocrisy of the rhetoric of
sacrifice when contrasted with the actual experience of soldiers in the
trenches.9 Owen,  in  one  of  his  most  well-known  poems,  directly
tackled Horace’s line, by calling it the “big lie” that people keep on
telling  children  who  are  “ardent  for  some  desperate  glory”  whilst
having no idea what experiencing war truly means.10 
Contrary  to  this  instrumental  use  of  sacrifice,  Patočka  strived  to
identify a radically different, positive aspect of human sacrifice. This
alternative  characterization  emerges,  for  example,  in  Patočka’s
depiction of the “spiritual person” – who represents the opposite of
6 For an investigation of the ritual of the unknown soldier, see WITTMAN 2011.
7 In her book, Wittman recalled the celebration that followed the death of 19 Italians, in
the 2003 Nasiriyah bombing,  to  show an example of  today’s  instrumental  use  of  the
ritual and rhetoric of sacrifice.
8 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Dulce_et_decorum_est_pro_patria_mori#/medi
a/File:Memorial_Amphitheater_-_rear_pediment_-_Arlington_National_Cemetery_-
_2011.JPG.
9 For  a  general  account  of  English  poetry  during  the  Great  War,  see  JOHNSTON 1964;
ROBERTS 2007. 
10 See OWEN 1964, 55.
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pro-government intellectuals, who are only concerned with their own
success. A “spiritual person” is ready to sacrifice herself in order to
«throw the problematicity of reality in the face of society».11 This kind
of sacrifice constitutes an extreme act of opposition to any attempt by
those in power to portray a monolithic and simplistic image of social
reality by concealing its inner conflicts and crises. The spiritual person
is  precisely  the  one  who  does  not  surrender  to  this  normalized
representation,  and  hence  struggles  to  shed  light  on  the  most
problematic aspects of today’s world. Sacrifice – the act of offering, if
necessary even one’s own life, for no apparent profit – is for Patočka
the means by which the spiritual  person can demonstrate the most
intimate aspect of her being.  
The  question  arising  from  this  double  characterization  of
(proper/improper) sacrifice is  the following:  how is  it  possible that
two utterly different meanings stem from the same phenomenon? On
the  one  hand,  sacrifice  is  understood  as  part  of  a  process  of
pacification and normalization, and on the other hand sacrifice is seen
as  destabilization  and conflict.  I  intend to  answer  this  question  by
following a  path  that  will  range between philosophy,  anthropology
and the social sciences. Given the limited scope of this article, I do not
aim  to  expound  the  extensive  debate  on  sacrifice  that  animated
twentieth-century  intellectual  culture.  I  will  rather  try  to  clarify
Patočka’s understanding of sacrifice by showing the ways in which he
draws upon previous anthropological and sociological investigations.
To this end, I will mainly refer to Émile Durkheim, particularly his late
work  Les formes élémentaires  de la  vie  religieuse  (1912),  which Patočka
often quoted in his own writing.12 I will also address other thinkers
who in various ways inherited and renewed Durkheim’s studies on
11 PATOČKA 2002b, 366.
12 PATOČKA’S first reference to Durkheim dates back to 1946. See PATOČKA 2004b, 152. In 1967,
he recollected – rather critically – Durkheim’s interpretation of myth. See PATOČKA 2004c,
400. In a series of lectures from 1974, he also briefly referred to Durkheim’s sociological
analysis of the decline of Western civilization. In this regard, he suggested a parallelism
between Durkheim and Masaryk, stemming from their works on suicide. See  PATOČKA
2002e,  429. The most important references to Durkheim are in the  Heretical Essays. See
PATOČKA 2002c, 101-2, 111. 
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religion and society,  such as  Henri  Hubert,  Marcel  Mauss,  and the
representatives  of  the  so-called  “sacred  sociology”:  Roger  Caillois,
Georges Bataille and other members of the Collège de sociologie.13 An
insight  into  Mircea  Eliade’s  and  Elias  Canetti’s  reflections  on  the
sacred and political power will complete the picture. In what follows,
we shall see that ideas stemming from the investigations of all these
thinkers  are  essential  for  understanding  Patočka’s  approach  to  the
theme of sacrifice and also for better characterizing whether and how
a “proper  sacrifice”  can actually  become an instrument  of  political
dissent within human societies.
1. The Emergence of Heterogeneity
In one of his private seminars from the 1970s, Patočka asks: what can
save today’s humanity from the violent situation into which the so-
called “technical age” has forced it? To answer this question, he refers
back  to  a  passage  from  Hölderlin’s  poem  Patmos.14 This  is  a  well-
known passage  which Heidegger  also  draws on  in  his  writings  on
technology. «But where danger threatens / That which saves from it
also grows».15 With this  quote  Patočka wants  to  underline  how the
only way to resolve the existential conflict that characterizes today’s
humanity is through conflict itself. Only by radicalizing and expanding
the conflict to its extreme can humans think of truly overcoming it: «To
resolve  conflict  with  conflict  would  mean  to  reach  the  limit  of
exhausting  life;  not  only  emptying  life  of  its  singular  contents,
13 References  to  Caillois  and Bataille  are  both  present  in  Patočka’s  works.  See  PATOČKA
1996b,  230,  where  he  referred  to  Caillois’  ideas  of  “imperative  de  connaissance”  and
“instinct  d’abandon”.  See  CAILLOIS 1935,  5-10.  See  also  PATOČKA 1996a,  285,  where  he
mentions  Bataille  as  one  of  the  representatives  of  the  “mystical  inclinations”  of
contemporary philosophy. Patočka refers to Bataille also in two letters to Václav Ritter,
dated 9 June 1951 and 22 May 1952. In the second one, he asks Ritter about his opinion
on Bataille’s article «L’inceste et le passage de l’animal à l’homme» (see BATAILLE 1951).
14 PATOČKA 2002a, 389.
15 «Wo aber Gefahr ist / wäscht das Rettende auch», Friedrich Hölderlin, Patmos (1803). See
also HEIDEGGER, 2013, 42. 
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remaining forever clinging to it,  but pushing oneself to the extreme
limit».16 Sacrifice is  precisely what makes this extreme radicalization
possible: «[…] It is not the wait for a favour, but an advance to the
furthest  limit  of  alienation,  where  mystery  is  conserved,  but  man
effectively sacrifices himself for this conservation».17
According to Patočka, people who are willing to sacrifice themselves
in such an extreme way do not simply aim at overcoming the conflict
which  characterizes  their  existences;  they  rather  choose  sacrifice
precisely to  show this conflict. This conflict is essentially the conflict
between,  on  the  one  hand,  the  tendency  of  the  technical  age  to
monopolize every aspect of life, and on the other the human resilience
against this form of violent control. Paradoxically, in order to reject this
monopolization  of  the  self,  humans  must  be  willing  to  sacrifice
themselves. Only in this way can they regain – in a tragic, yet no less
powerful manner – full control of their own existence: namely, control
over  their  life  as  well  as  over  their  own  death.  In  light  of  this
perspective, we can also understand why Patočka described the final
stage of  human existential  development in terms of «self-finding in
self-surrender».18 In  order  to  reach  a  complete  self-achievement,
humans  have  to  surrender  themselves  –  that  is  to  say,  sacrifice
everything that they own, even their own existence. Only by doing this
can they regain authentic control over themselves.
This  element  of  utter  surrendering  in  Patočka’s  idea  of  sacrifice
might suggest an analogy with the kenotic motif, which is widespread
within  Christian  theology  and  takes  the  shape  of  a  mystical  self-
emptying of the self.19 However,  Patočka rejects this interpretation as
he clearly underlines  that  his  idea of  sacrifice does  not involve  any
16 PATOČKA 2002a, 392.
17 PATOČKA 2002a, 393. Italics are mine.
18 See PATOČKA 2009, 233.
19 On the topic of kénosis (annihilation, self-emptying) see, for example, the Epistle of Paul
to the Philippians 2:7. It is worth underlining that the meaning of kénosis in Philippians
2:7 as well as in the Gospels does not imply neither a superiority of transcendence over
immanence nor a critique of finitude and a subsequent detachment from the world. This
aspect rather emerged and became central in medieval speculative mysticism. See on
this, for instance, DUBILET 2018.
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escape  from  the  world  and  its  dramatic  character.  Only  a  worldly
sacrifice,  involving  people’s  concrete  existence,  can  actually  shatter
reality and reveal its falsifications.20 In order to  understand how the
function  of  sacrifice  can  be  practical  and  political,  and  not  merely
symbolic, it  is helpful  to consider how anthropology and the social
sciences addressed the idea and practice of sacrificing in the context of
indigenous peoples.21 By recalling this topic, which Patočka regards as
central  to his  definition of  sacredness and sacrifice,  it  also becomes
possible  to  examine  his  idea  of  “proper  sacrifice”  in  a  new  light,
helping to clarify the ambiguities that this concept might entail. 
In the fifth of his Heretical Essays, Patočka highlights how one of the
fundamental  contrasts  that  regulates  the  world is  that  between  the
profane and the sacred; that is, between what on the one hand belongs
to  everyday  life  and  what,  on  the  other  hand,  constitutes  the
exceptional and unexpected traits of human existence. Since the most
ancient forms of human society emerged, the equilibrium between the
sacred  and  the  profane  has  essentially  informed  both  the  lives  of
individuals and the nature of social institutions. According to Patočka,
this  equilibrium ends up changing in early modernity – correlating
with the gradual emergence of a new form of political power that aims
at dissolving any substantial  difference between what is sacred and
what is profane.22 
20 To a student asking whether his insight into conflict and sacrifice, as it emerged in the
afore-mentioned «Čtyři semináře», could correspond to a «turn towards mystical ends»,
Patočka answered that  this  was  not  the  case,  since  «[he]  would see  the matter  in  a
pragmatic,  common  way»  (see  PATOČKA 2002a,  393).  This  is  why  I  don’t  think  that
Patočka’s  idea  of  authentic  sacrifice  can  be interpreted  from an exclusively  religious
standpoint, as if “authentic sacrifice” could only mean re-enacting the  imitatio Christi.
Nonetheless, the influence of Christian theology and intellectual heritage on the way in
which Patočka addressed the theme of sacrifice is indisputable. See on this especially
PATOČKA 2002d, 147-60, where the difference between prehistoric and Christian sacrifice
(and the primacy of the latter over the former) is particularly emphasized. I am thankful
to an anonymous reviewer for having raised this point.
21 I deliberately choose to use the term “indigenous”, in order to refer to native tribes and
social groups, instead of “primitive”, even though the latter often recurs in the works of
Durkheim and Caillois. 
22 The elimination of every qualitative difference within social life is at the core of the idea
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The dynamics  that  regulate the complex relationship between the
sacred and the profane are at the centre of Émile Durkheim’s sociology
of  religion.23 According to  Durkheim,  what  characterizes  the  life  of
indigenous peoples is the fact that for them any hierarchy between the
sacred  and  the  profane  is  inconceivable.  For  these  peoples,  the
principle that regulates the relationship between these two domains is
not  hierarchical,  but  rather  based  on  absolute  heterogeneity.  The
sacred and the profane are rigidly separated: «In the history of human
thought,  there  is  no  other  example  of  two  categories  of  things  as
profoundly differentiated or as radically opposed to one another».24
Yet Durkheim shows how these two categories are also inextricably
bound  to  each  other.  This  peculiar  bond,  which  involves  both
separation and contact, is exemplified by the act of sacrificing, which
straddles  the  threshold  between  these  two  realms.25 This  peculiar
character  of  sacrifice  is  present  in  its  etymology:  “sacrifice”  means
“sacrum  facere”  –  transforming  something  that  is  profane  into
something sacred by momentarily breaking the division between the
two domains.
Looking at the habits and rituals of indigenous tribes, one can easily
recognize  how  the  sacred  and  the  profane  are  for  them  both
constitutive  elements  of  reality.  Their  juxtaposition  is  not  merely
symbolic, but essential in the development of worldly affairs – to the
extent that they are the fundamental ground of all that exists. To show
this,  Durkheim specifically  referred to  the habits  and rituals  of  the
Warramunga tribe, as they were first described in Spencer and Gillen’s
The Native Tribes of Central Australia  (1899).26 Of all the rituals of the
Warramunga,  the  Nathagura,  or  Fire Ceremony,  is  probably the one
of “supercivilization”, which Patočka introduced in the 1950s. See,  PATOČKA 1996a, 243-
302.
23 William E. Paden underlined how for Durkheim “the sacred” does not entail any idea of
transcendence,  mystery,  or power.  Rather,  by sacred Durkheim meant «an index of a
system of behavior and representation which follows its own rules». PADEN 1991, 11.
24 DURKHEIM 1995, 36. 
25 On the characterization of sacrifice as the threshold between sacred and profane, see also
MAUSS & HUBERT 1981 [1899].
26 See GILLEN & SPENCER 1969.
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that  best  demonstrates  how  for  this  tribe  «two  heterogeneous  and
incommensurable worlds exist in fact[.] In one world [man] languidly
carries on his daily life; the other is one that he cannot enter without
abruptly entering into relations with extraordinary powers that excite
him to the point of frenzy».27 Commenting in the fifth of his heretical
essays  on  Durkheim’s  reference  to  this  example,  Patočka  also
underlines how addressing such phenomena might help to overcome
the modern «positivist prejudice that attributes to the everyday world
a  primacy  over  the  other  world».  Understanding  how  indigenous
peoples address the idea of the sacred and of sacrifice can help today’s
humanity re-learn how to live «through the whole opposition of the
sacred  and  the  profane»,28 which  is  precisely  what  Patočka  thinks
modern political power has precluded. By saying this, Patočka is in no
way urging a relapse into the crude dichotomy between the sacred and
the profane that characterize indigenous societies. Living through the
opposition  of  the  sacred  and  the  profane  rather  means  for  him
acknowledging that no one can interpret the world on the basis of one
single paradigm (be it religious, philosophical, or political) and that a
more comprehensive analysis is needed in order to fully disclose its
complexity.
As the case of sacrifice suggests, a profound ambiguity lies at the
core of the relationship between the sacred and the profane. These two
domains  are  indeed  rigidly  separated,  and  yet  interconnected  and
present  within  social  life,  the  functioning of  which is  continuously
regulated  by  moments  of  both  sacralisation  and  profanation.  This
same ambiguity is also at the core of the analysis of Roger Caillois in
his  1939  book  L’homme  et  le  sacré.29 Caillois,  a  student  of  George
Dumézil and Marcel Mauss and one of the founders of the Collège de
Sociologie,30 highlighted how this ambiguity does not only inflect the
27 DURKHEIM 1995, 220.
28 PATOČKA 2002c, 103.
29 CAILLOIS 2001.
30 Regarding the foundation and history of the Collège, see FALASCA-ZAMPONI 2011; HOLLIER
1995; About the appropriation of Durkheim’s sociology of religion by the members of the
Collège, see RICHMAN, 2002; 1995, 59-76.
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relationship  between  the  sacred  and  the  profane  –  as  Durkheim
maintained – but emerges also within the very idea of the sacred itself.
Indeed  the  “sacred”  is  not  a  property,  but  rather  a  force,  always
involving a polarity between  opposed elements. In the observer, the
sacred generates both desire and fear. Both Greek and Latin words for
“sacred” reveal this internal tension. The Greek term hágos means both
sacrifice and sacrilege while the Latin term  sacer stands for what is
holy but also for what is cursed.31 This dual nature,  which involves
both  attraction  and  repulsion,  characterizes  every  aspect  of  sacred
being. This dyadic character is precisely what modern political power
– which for Patočka is  grounded on the idea of  rational  order and
discipline – utterly represses and conceals. According to Mircea Eliade,
who addressed this  issue in  Das  Heilige  und  das  Profane  (1956),  the
existence  (or  non-existence)  of  this  duality  represents  the  biggest
difference between primitive and modern societies.32 In the modern
period  political  struggles  are  aimed  at  attaining  absolute  power,33
whereas in primitive societies such a univocal and monolithic power,
by which all differences are neutralized, was rather seen as cause of
confusion –  insofar  as  it  reminded people  of  the  primordial  chaos,
rather than an organized political system. From this perspective, the
origin of  human communities  is  not  caused by the  emergence of  a
univocal  authority,  but  rather  lies  on  a  principle  of  duality  and
opposition.34 The  social  and  political  life  of  indigenous  peoples  is
determined by regular irruptions of the sacred within everyday life,
which gives rise to distinctions and juxtapositions constructed within
reality  itself.  Sacrifice becomes seen as the  fundamental  instrument
that regulates these irruptions.
31 See ERNOUT & MEILLET 2001, 585-7. Quoted in CAILLOIS 2001, 35.
32 See  ELIADE 1987.  Several  interpreters  showed  how  Durkheim’s  and  Caillois’
investigations had a major impact on Eliade’s interpretation of the idea of the sacred. See
HANEGRAAF 1999, 356; PADEN 1991, 22.
33 In his essay on the idea of supercivilization, Patočka pinpointed how the phrase from the
Gospel of John: ut omnes unum sind, exemplifies this political aim at establishing a perfect
unity which is for him at the core of the modern idea of political power. See  PATOČKA
1996a, 263.
34 See ELIADE 1987, 23.
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This  conception  has  a  crucial  political  implication,  as  it  entails
understanding the world not on the basis of unity, but according to a
principle  of  substantial  duality.  According  to  this  interpretation,
difference  is  not  perceived  as  mere  broken  unity.  On the  contrary,
every unity is nothing but a recomposed difference: the “two” always
precedes  the  “one”.  This  schema  contrasts  with  the  way in  which
humanity  has  conceived  of  politics  since  the  age  of  classical
civilizations  up  until  the  modern  period  –  namely,  as  a  way  to
establish an absolute  imperium (a unique source of power). From the
perspective of such a system, the logic of the sacred, fundamental to
indigenous peoples, cannot be comprehended and is in fact perceived
as a threat to the stability of the system. This explains why sacrifice
acquired a different meaning in modernity.  For indigenous peoples,
sacrifice represents an essential way of regulating the social through
the continuous reassertion of the duality of sacred/profane. For the
moderns,  by  contrast,  sacrifice  is  a  destabilizing  phenomenon  that
inevitably causes an internal shattering of the (assumed) unity upon
which the (modern) idea of the political is premised, and it therefore
must be neutralized at all costs.
The indigenous acknowledgement of the duality sacred/profane as
the fundamental ground of their life-world has consequences for the
structure of these societies. This is a point which Caillois stresses in
particular, referring back to the original studies of Hubert and Mauss.35
The life of a totemic community, such as the tribes of central Australia,
is  regulated  by  a  systematic  antagonism  between  the  different
“phratries”  which  compose  this  community.  In  such  a  community,
each phratry is linked to a totem, which is usually portrayed as an
animal. Everything in the surrounding world that can be linked to that
animal (the places where it lives and takes shelter, the food that it eats,
etc.) belongs to the phratry and can be used only by its members. This
entails a concrete partition of the world on the basis of this totemic
system. This division, however, involves a communication between the
35 See, in particular, DURKHEIM & MAUSS 1901-1902; 1906. About the contribution of Hubert
and Mauss to Durkheim’s analysis of the sacred, see ISAMBERT 1976.
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parts. For example, the members of a phratry cannot eat their totemic
animal, which is sacred to them. On the contrary, members  of other
phratries can exploit this animal without incurring any trouble. This
schema also works in a similar manner in the regulation of sexual and
reproductive activities. This shows how for these tribes the essentially
dyadic structure of society is what guarantees the good functioning of
the world. Breaking these rules would mean dooming the world to
destruction  and  chaos.  The  peculiarity  of  this  structure  consists
precisely in  the fact that it is not grounded on any idea of unity and
hierarchy, but rather on a principle of complexity and duality – that is,
on the same principle that regulates the division between sacred and
profane. In this context, the “imperium”, i.e. the authority, is not held
by a person or by a party, but is guaranteed by the entirety of those
sacred  rules  and  prescriptions  to  which  every  element  of  these
societies is subjected.
2. The Loss of the Sacred
The  social  structure  described  above  mutates  over  time.  The  more
numerous and complex social structures become, the harder it is to
preserve the complementary character of the sacred/profane schema.
Caillois acknowledges how, already in the case of several indigenous
tribes, for instance the native American tribe of the Zuñi, the division
of  the community into phratries  survives  only within myths.36 This
fundamental  transformation  corresponds,  for  Caillois,  with  the
“genesis of power” – namely, with the emergence of modern political
power in the current usage of the term. According to this new model
of  social  life,  the  principle  of  supremacy  of  single  individuals,  or
certain groups,  over  all  others  is  substituted for  the  relationship of
complementarity between equal parts.
The emergence of the figure of the sacred chief within indigenous
groups most clearly represents this societal change. Initially, the social
36 CAILLOIS 2001, 88.
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role of the chief is characterized by a complex series of restrictions and
prohibitions,  which  inevitably  end  up  limiting  his  field  of  action.
Insofar as the chief is regarded as sacred by his people, all contact with
him must be subjected to strict rituals that regulate his entire existence,
so that his figure ends up resembling one of a prisoner rather than that
of a king: «The ideal is that he does nothing at all; that he reigns but
not  governs.  The  simple  and  regular  diffusion  of  his  holy  energy
renders his beneficent influence efficacious».37 This situation changes
as soon as the sovereign ceases to play a circumscribed role within a
societal scheme still governed by the constant intermingling between
the sacred and the profane, and starts claiming an exclusive hold upon
everything that is sacred. In this new situation, the leader is no more
subjected  to  all  the  aforementioned  rules.  Rather,  his  absolute
sacredness  translates  into  the  capacity  to  transcend  all  limits  and
prescriptions, which are now exclusively imposed upon his subjects.
The condition of equilibrium and heterogeneity that characterized the
structure of the phratries is therefore broken by the emergence of a
new master-slave dialectic,  whose essence  is  not  constituted by the
respect  and distance  between actors,  but  by  the  subjugation  of  the
weakest by the strongest. 
The outcome of this process is the loss of the sacred as a constitutive
part of social life. Insofar as sacredness becomes a privilege solely of
an  elite  group  of  rulers,  everything  that  falls  outside  of  this  elite
becomes  purely  profane.  The  principle  of  violent  authority  is
substituted  for  the  principle  of  collaboration amongst  social  actors.
The  sacred  leader  now  holds  all  power,  whilst  common  people  –
whose lives and activities have lost any sacred characterization – end
up being at his complete mercy. The consequence of the expulsion of
the sacred from public life is that the sacred ends up being estranged
from concrete human existence. According to Patočka, this evacuation
leads  to  the  sacred  becoming  a  prerogative  of  religious  discourse:
«Religion  is  not  the  sacred,  nor  does  it  arise  directly  from  the
experience of sacral orgies and rites; rather, it is where the sacred qua
37 CAILLOIS 2001, 93.
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demonic  is  being  explicitly  overcome.  Sacral  experiences  become
religious as soon as there is an attempt to introduce responsibility into
the  sacred  or  to  regulate  the  sacred  thereby».38 This  phenomenon
corresponds to the rise of monotheisms, according to which God is no
longer seen as a present and active force within social life but instead
as something essentially distant and inscrutable; a mystery which man
can  try  to  decipher  only  through  the  mediation  of  liturgy.39 God’s
withdrawal from the world can be interpreted precisely as a human
attempt to justify the growing desacralisation of historical reality, itself
caused by the rise of political forces. Referring to this phenomenon,
Patočka claims that the great novelty of Christianity consisted in the
introduction of an idea of absolute transcendence. This novelty goes
hand  in  hand  with  the  rise  of  the  first  great  political  projects  of
humanity,  which aimed at  establishing a  dominion over  the  world.
Inasmuch  as  the  world  became  purely  profane  –  following  God’s
withdrawal – nothing prevents humans from attempting to dominate
this  world, which is  no longer protected by any sacred prohibition.
«The distancing of humans from ‘nature’, which is no longer the locus
of  being  human  but  rather  something  from  which  humans  are
separated by their unique unmediated relation, their relation to God,
now enables them to perceive this ‘nature’ as an ‘object’».40
The  dismissal  of  the  sacred,  which for  both  Patočka  and Caillois
comes  hand in  hand with  the  rise  of  modern  political  power,  has
further consequences. According to Patočka, what gets lost in the so-
called “technical age” is the distinction between work days and holy
days:  between  the  time  of  profane  labor  and  the  time  of  holy
celebration.41 Like the dualism between the sacred and the profane,
with which it is tightly connected, the dualism between work days and
holy  days  also  constitutes  a  fundamental  social  component  for
38 PATOČKA 2002c, 103.
39 This  idea  of  the  “sacred”  is  directly  opposed  to  the  Durkeimian  paradigm,  which
understood the sacred as a category of world classification and ritual behavior and not as
a transcendent and inscrutable principle. See on this PADEN 1991, 12.
40 PATOČKA 2002c, 110.
41 PATOČKA 2002c, 98ff.
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indigenous peoples. In his analysis of the formation and functioning of
human crowds, Elias Canetti acknowledges the  social importance of
this  phenomenon.42 According  to  Canetti’s  interpretation,  human,
political communities are able to preserve their internal structure and
order  as  long  as  its  members  undergo  a  series  of  regulations  and
prescriptions. This preservation is not painless and has the effect of a
burden  (which  Canetti  calls  a  “sting”)  upon  the  existence  of  the
members  of  the  community.  At  some point,  this  burden  inevitably
becomes intolerable, and humans have to find a way to discharge it.
Whenever a society is unable to find a peaceful way of discharging this
burden of stings,  the phenomenon of the “reversal crowd” appears,
which ends up overturning the existing establishment. Canetti points
out how this idea of dramatic reversal is widespread in human history
and can be  easily  detected  in  very  distant  cultural  traditions:  from
Hinduism  to  Christianity.43 In  order  to  avoid  the  irruption  of  such
dramatic reversals, indigenous peoples resorted to collective festivals.
Caillois,  whose  insights  on  this  topic  parallel  those  of  Canetti’s,44
underlines how for these peoples the festival consists of a complete,
controlled  and  temporary  overturning  of  all  the  prescriptions  that
normally regulate community life. By celebrating, humans are allowed
to break the rules and enter – even though only momentarily – the
space of the sacred. In so doing, they can free themselves from the
burdens that  loom over their  lives  and that  threaten to subvert  the
social equilibrium. The aim of the festival is to rebuild the order of the
world. Suspending the distinction between the sacred and the profane
means  artificially  recreating  the  condition  of  that  primordial  chaos
from which every human community stems.
The most important moment of the festival – the moment in which it
42 See in particular Canetti’s description of the Muharram Festival of the Shiites in CANETTI
1962, 146ff.
43 To  demonstrate  this  point,  Canetti  refers  back  to  the  Shatapatha-Brahmana  as  an
example: «For whatever food man eats in this world, by that food he is eaten in the next
world». CANETTI 1962, 324. 
44 Adorno pointed out this  similarity during a radio conversation with Canetti  in  1962.
CANETTI & ADORNO 1996, 14.
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culminates and comes to an end – is sacrifice. By means of  the act of
sacrificing (either their most precious belongings or even their own
lives),  people  can finally  overcome the  division  between  these  two
realms and therefore re-establish this same division on a new level –
having  discharged  any  and  all  accumulated  burdens.  This
interpretation  finds  its  roots  in  Hegel’s  analysis  of  sacrifice,  as  it
appears in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For Hegel, sacrifice constitutes
the  moment  in  which  the  cult  stops  being  an  abstract  entity  and
becomes real:  «The act of  the Cult itself  begins,  therefore,  with the
pure  surrender of a possession which the owner, apparently without
any profit whatever to himself, pours away or lets rise up in smoke. In
so doing, he […] renounces [his] personality and the return of his act
into  himself».45 We  can  easily  detect  here  the  same  aspect  of  self-
surrendering  that  is  also  central  to  Patocka’s  understanding  of
sacrifice.46 By  giving  up  their  own  individualities,  belongings,
possessions – and, in some cases, their own lives – during the festival
frenzy,  humans  can  finally  cast  aside  the  burdens  that  mark  their
everyday existence and start a new life. 
This  mechanism  ends  up  changing  with  the  emergence  of  what
Patočka defines as ‘supercivilization’ or the ‘technical age’: the age in
which humanity takes on the endless accumulation of power as the
ultimate political goal. Since one of the main characteristics of this age
is  the  elimination  of  any  distinction  between  the  sacred  and  the
profane,  and therefore  also between a  work day and a holy day,  it
follows  that  in  this  context  there  is  no  way  to  discharge  the
accumulated social burdens that remain dangerously present within
society. What is the consequence of this inability to discharge? Canetti
answers this question by showing that individuals who are incapable
of  getting  rid  of  their  “stings”  end  up  as  schizophrenics.  In  other
words, when individuals are unable to surrender their individuality
and  blend  into  the  crowd  that  animates  the  festival,  they  end  up
45 HEGEL 1977, 434.
46 It  is  worth  remembering  that  Patočka  translated  Hegel’s  Phenomenology  of  Mind into
Czech in 1960. See HEGEL 1960.
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finding this  crowd inside of  themselves  –  in  the  labyrinth  of  their
mind.47 Patočka’s analysis of  the dialectics of supercivilization shows
how the same logic also applies on a larger scale: a civilization which
is unable to recognize and discharge its internal tensions seems to be
doomed to the same schizophrenic hysteria described by Canetti. The
supercivilization essay dates back to the 1950s, when Czechoslovakia
was facing the hardest years of Stalinism. It is within this context that
Patočka  describes  the  debilitation  to  which  civilization  succumbs
whenever  it  tries  to  conceal  its  inner  political  conflicts  rather  than
facing  them  directly.  This  concealment  causes  a  schizophrenic
dichotomy between private and public life.
The realization of the old idea of the unity of the human – of
the abolition of the contradiction between public and private
(Hegel’s state and civil society) – seems to undergo a mutation
in the  opposite  direction.  Externally  the  contrast  is  actually
fixed, as no one has the opportunity to build a solid private
dimension any more. Nonetheless, in no way does this entail
the cancellation of the difference between the private opinion
and the point  of  view that  is  publically manifested.  On the
contrary,  humans  are  more  torn  apart  than  ever  by  the
principle of their private (economic) interest.48
What emerges from this is a condition of widespread social hypocrisy,
which  political  dissidents  such  as  Aleksandr  Solzhenitsyn,  Václav
Havel,  and Leszek Kołakowski later referred to as  “institutionalized
lying”, or “living in a lie”.49 In this  peculiar historical  situation the
political function of sacrifice also changes. We saw how sacrifice can
be defined as a force which lies on the threshold between the sacred
and  the  profane,  always  regulating  both  their  proximity  and  their
division.  Whenever  it  is  carried  out  within  modern  civilization  –
which collapses the sharp division between the sacred and the profane
47 See CANETTI 1962, 321ff.
48 PATOCKA 1996a, 263.
49 See, in particular, SOLŽENICYN 2004; KOŁAKOWSKI 1983, 126; HAVEL 1985, 23-96.
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–  sacrifice  loses  its  regulative,  ordering  characteristics,  and  rather
acquires that shattering aspect that Patočka described as the essence of
a proper sacrifice. In a political system that is grounded on a principle
of monolithic authority, anything that can reignite the heterogeneous
aspects of the social structure becomes a disturbing element; it is no
longer a fundamental component of a community life, but something
that must be silenced and suppressed – whatever the cost. 
3. Conclusion: A Sacrificial Community?
The attempts  of  Patočka and Caillois  to reconnect  the discourse on
sacrifice  and the sacred with the nature  of  modern political  power
inevitably run up against a series of setbacks. For the members of the
Collège de sociologie, reenacting a positive idea of the sacred means
creating  a  new  «moral  community,  different  in  part  from  that
ordinarily  uniting  scholars  and  bound,  precisely,  to  the  virulent
character of the realm studied and of the laws that little by  little are
revealed to govern it».50 This soon translated into a re-evaluation of the
role that irrational forces, passions, and instincts play in forming the
social  structure,  and  also  into  a  critique  of  the  idea  that  rational
calculation should be considered the only valid political instrument. In
the  delicate  political  situation  of  interwar  France,  this  intellectual
project aimed at warning the public against the emerging totalitarian
ideologies that were spreading throughout Europe. Nonetheless, the
activities of the Collège have been often interpreted in the opposite
sense, i.e., as if its members were complicit in the same phenomenon
that,  theoretically,  they  wanted  to  denounce.51 This  profound
ambiguity  is  particularly  evident  in  Bataille’s  1933  essay  “The
Psychological Structure of Fascism”, and it also re-emerged during the
50 «Note  sur  la  foundation  d’un Collège  de  sociologie».  In  Acéphale,  Vol.  3-4,  1937,  26.
Quoted in HOLLIER 1988, 5.
51 About the connection between the Collège de sociologie and twentieth-century political
ideologies, see in particular FALASCA-ZAMPONI 2011; GEROULANOS 2006.
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meetings of the Collège, as well as in the pages of Acéphale.52 Bataille,
Caillois and their collaborators were not,  however, the only targets of
this critique: their main forerunner – Émile Durkheim –was repeatedly
accused by various detractors of fostering an authoritarian conception
of society in his writing.53 The recent revival of interest in the activities
of the Collège, and also in the idea of a “moral community” that might
possibly emerge from the recurring crises of contemporary democratic
institutions,  shows  how  the  “sacred  sociology”  that  these  thinkers
wanted  to  outline  is  still  worthy  of  careful  consideration.54
Nonetheless, the ambiguous possibility of a political use (or misuse) of
the notion of the sacred remains. It is echoed, for example, by the same
Caillois who, in the preface to the third edition of  L’homme et le sacré
(1963), recollects the experience of the Collège as a moment of intense
activity, but also of great confusion. «When I wrote this essay I was
influenced by an almost exclusive preoccupation for the obscure and
urgent emotions that  disturb,  enthrall  and sometimes dominate the
human heart».55 This urgency – which translated into the attempt to
restore an “active” idea of the sacred, in order to counter the tendency
to neglect the abyssal forces that (as the emergence of fascism showed)
still impinged themselves upon the world – ended up in failure. «It
was like hoping for a miracle; and, in fact, these vacuous ambitions
remained a dead letter».56
If we look at Patočka’s philosophy of history, and especially at the
crucial passage between the fifth and the sixth of his  Heretical Essays,
we can easily detect similarities with Caillois. Is it still imaginable –
52 Concerning the meaning and problems of Bataille’s thought today, a series of excellent
contributions can be found in STRONGE 2017. See in particular chapter 3: PAWLETT 2017.
53 See, in particular, RANULF 1939; MCGOVERN 1941; MITCHELL 1931. For an accurate account
of this debate, see FALASCA-ZAMPONI 2006.
54 Among the numerous investigations about the Collège de sociologie that appeared over
the last few years, see in particular the essays collected in the special issue of  Economy
and Society, edited by Frank Pearce in 2003. In their linked analyses of the community
concept, Michel Blanchot and Jean-Luc Nancy have both referred back to the idea of
“moral community” that the members of the Collège first sketched. See BLANCHOT 1988;
NANCY 1991.
55 CAILLOIS 2013, 13.
56 CAILLOIS 2013, 14.
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Patočka asks – that we can overcome the “self-bondage of life” and
relearn how to live «through the whole opposition of the sacred and
the profane»57? The way in which he answers this question, namely by
looking at «the night, […] struggle and death»58 as experiences which
are necessary to form what he eventually called a “solidarity of the
shaken”, presents just as many ambiguities as Caillois’ arguments in
L’homme  et  le  sacré.  Is  the  “solidarity  of  the  shaken”,  that  is,  the
solidarity of those who are «shaken in their faith in the day, in ‘life’
and ‘peace’»,59 something similar to the moral community to which the
members of the Collège de sociologie referred? And is “sacrifice” – the
contact  with  and the  making  of  the  “sacred”  –  that  which  allows
humans to shape this  renewed solidarity,  in the same way that the
ritual  sacrifice  allowed  indigenous  peoples  to  recreate  their  social
structures  upon  new  bases?  We  cannot  conclusively  answer  this
question.  What we know for sure is  that both Patočka and Caillois
identify  the  loss  of  the  capacity  of  humanity  to  handle  the  radical
distinction between what is  sacred and what is  profane as  one the
deepest causes of the modern social and political crises.60 They also
share the idea that in the twentieth century war became humanity’s
extreme attempt to find a surrogate of the sacred festival,  with war
being interpreted as a cathartic and creative experience. For Patočka,
the First World War represented the orgiastic explosion that allowed
humanity to discharge the burdens that the German empire – built on
the  “ossified  bureaucracy”  of  conservative  Prussia  and  on  the
incredibly  narrow-minded  Lutheran  orthodoxy  –  had  accumulated:
«Long before the war, this Germany had already transformed Europe
into an energetic complex».61 Caillois shared a similar position: in 1949
57 PATOČKA 2002c, 103.
58 PATOČKA 2002c, 131.
59 PATOČKA 2002c, 135.
60 In this regard, I don’t think that Patočka’s idea of responsibility can be interpreted as an
overcoming of this distinction, insofar as being responsible does not mean for Patočka
dismissing, but rather becoming fully aware of the radicality of this distinction. See on
this  PATOČKA 2002c, 99-100. I need to thank an anonymous reviewer for allowing me to
re-think this complex aspect of Patočka’s thought.
61 PATOČKA 2002c, 120.
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he added to  the  second edition of  L’homme et  le  sacré  an appendix
entitled “War and the Sacred”. «War must not serve as a foundation
for peace, but peace must serve as preparation for war since peace is
only  a  simple  and  transitory  armistice  between  two  conflicts.  All
valuable effort is oriented toward war and finds its conservation in
it».62
In light of these ambiguities, one might well wonder if it is possible
to rediscover «the whole opposition of the sacred and the profane»
whilst  simultaneously avoiding the ideological  conclusions that this
stance seems to entail.  This question is as relevant today as ever, in
light of the continuous re-emergence of irrational forces and passions
within public debate, and of the misuse that political factions make of
them. In this regard, what should be underlined is that while Patočka
is not immune from the same ambiguities that are present in Caillois
and the other members of the Collège de sociologie – he also indicates
a  possible  path  that  leads beyond them.  This  path is  linked to  his
distinction  between  “proper”  and  “improper”  sacrifice.  A  proper
sacrifice  means  for  him preserving the  shattering and destabilizing
character  with  which  sacrificing  is  necessarily  endowed.  This  also
means avoiding the instrumentalisation of sacrifice for  political gain.
For  example,  we  can  imagine  ideological  and  violent  outcomes  of
sacrifice  that  aim  not  at  the  destabilization  of  crystallized  social
structures,  but  instead  at  the  imposition  of  reinforced,  reactionary
regimes. Maintaining the authenticity of sacrifice means rejecting any
misuse or violent  appropriation of it.  It  is therefore the example of
non-violent  political  dissent,  which  characterized  the  final  days  of
Patočka’s life as a spokesperson for Charter 77, and which mirrors his
understanding  of  politics  as  a  realm  of  freedom  and  truth,  that
represents in this sense the true idea of sacrifice that he most likely
had in mind. 
62 CAILLOIS 2003, 172. It is not surprising that, for both Patočka and Caillois, Ernst Jünger
became in this phase an important reference point.
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